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THE IMPERMISSIBILITY OF POLICE DECEPTION
IN JUVENILE INTERROGATIONS
Gina Kim*
Although perjury is a criminal offense in all states and a felony in many,
law enforcement may routinely lie to suspects during interrogations. This
widespread, judicially authorized practice consists of interrogators making
false promises of leniency that the suspect will receive a lighter sentence in
exchange for a confession, and making misrepresentations about the
evidence against the suspect. Police deception in interrogations becomes
even more problematic when used against juvenile suspects because the
psychological vulnerability of minors may lead them to succumb to deceptive
pressures and even to falsely confess.
This Note explores the debate surrounding the use of police deception
tactics in interrogations and suggests that, for juvenile suspects, the practice
should be categorically barred through state legislation. The suggestibility
and susceptibility of youth render them more likely to falsely confess than
adults are. This Note argues that deceptive interrogation tactics inherently
violate due process rights by allowing law enforcement to lie to youth who
are more likely to believe them than adult suspects are. Because of these
concerns, deception in juvenile interrogations should be prohibited per se
through state legislation. Such legislation should categorically prohibit law
enforcement from intentionally misrepresenting the evidence available
against the juvenile suspect or from intentionally engaging in other deceptive
practices that are fundamentally unfair and unjust.
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 248
I. THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS AND POLICE DECEPTION ................... 249
A. The Law of Confessions .................................................... 250
B. Police Deception in Interrogations .................................. 253
1. Categories of Police Deception .................................. 254
2. Courts’ Analysis of Police Deception in
Interrogations ............................................................ 256
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2019, Columbia
University; B.A., 2015, Ewha Womans University. Thank you to Professor Bruce Green for
his guidance and to the editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review for their editing expertise.
I also want to thank my parents, siblings, and Junyeong for their consistent prayers, love, and
support.

247

248

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

3. Statutes Regulating Police Deception in
Interrogations ............................................................ 259
II. CRITICISMS AND DEFENSES OF POLICE DECEPTION IN
INTERROGATIONS ................................................................... 260
A. Criticisms.......................................................................... 260
B. Defenses............................................................................ 262
C. Special Considerations for Juveniles ............................... 263
III. STATE LEGISLATION CATEGORICALLY BARRING THE USE OF
POLICE DECEPTION IN JUVENILE INTERROGATIONS .............. 266
A. Extending the Juvenile-Protection Rationale to the
Prohibition of Police Deception ..................................... 266
B. State Legislation Categorically Barring Police
Deception ........................................................................ 268
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 270
INTRODUCTION
Making a Murderer, a popular Netflix documentary series tracking the
murder trials of Steven Avery and his nephew, Brendan Dassey, offers a rare
glimpse into how police interrogations are conducted behind closed doors.1
The videotaped interrogations depict how the police feigned sympathy,
misrepresented the evidence they had, and deliberately asked leading
questions to elicit a confession from Mr. Dassey, a sixteen-year-old with an
intellectual disability.2 Whether the police conduct violated Mr. Dassey’s
constitutional rights by forcing him to falsely confess quickly became a
matter of public debate3 and a legal battle in the courts.4
This popular documentary once again brought the issue of false
confessions, and the ensuing miscarriage of justice, to the forefront of public
and legal debate. False confessions are the most common contributing factor

1. See Adam Liptak, Was It a False Confession in ‘Making a Murderer’?: The Supreme
Court May Decide, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/
us/politics/supreme-court-making-a-murderer.html [https://perma.cc/9V38-AA25]; Jane
Kelly, UVA Expert: ‘Making a Murderer’ Proves Juvenile Interrogations Must Change, UVA
TODAY (June 13, 2018), https://news.virginia.edu/content/uva-expert-making-murdererproves-juvenile-interrogations-must-change [https://perma.cc/5HT3-4ZUT] (“What makes
the Dassey case unusual is that in Wisconsin, police must videotape an interrogation, so we
do have that record.”).
2. See Liptak, supra note 1.
3. See Douglas Starr, In the “Making a Murderer” Case, the Supreme Court Could Help
Address the Problem of False Confessions, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/in-the-making-a-murderer-case-the-supremecourt-could-help-address-the-problem-of-false-confessions
[https://perma.cc/H6J8-9TDJ]
(“[H]undreds of thousands of viewers signed petitions calling for [Brendan Dassey’s]
pardon.”).
4. Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2677
(2018).
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to wrongful convictions in homicide-related cases.5 To secure confessions
from suspects during interrogations, police often engage in deceptive tactics
by misrepresenting the facts about the evidence they possess or by making
false promises of leniency.6 Courts generally endorse these deceptive police
tactics based on the assumption that an innocent person will not admit guilt
to a crime that the person did not commit.7 This conventional wisdom,
however, has been disputed by subsequent studies, and the debate is far from
settled.8 And for juvenile defendants, studies show that suspects under the
age of eighteen are between two to three times more likely to confess under
the pressure of deception than are adults.9
This Note examines whether a per se bar against the use of police
deception in juvenile interrogations is proper. This Note argues that a per se
bar is necessary because of the psychological vulnerability of adolescents,
critiques an Illinois statute regulating police deception in juvenile
interrogations,10 and outlines what types of police deception should be
categorically barred by drawing insight from sample legislation.
Part I of this Note discusses the law of confessions and provides an
overview of police deceptive tactics and the way in which those tactics
interact with confession jurisprudence. Part II canvasses the defenses and
criticisms of police use of deceptive tactics when interrogating adult suspects
and highlights special considerations concerning juvenile suspects. Part III
further narrows the scope of the debate to juvenile suspects, supports a per se
bar on police deception in juvenile interrogations, and details what types of
deception should be prohibited.
I. THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS AND POLICE DECEPTION
The use of police deception during interrogations may impact the
voluntariness of the suspect’s resulting confession.11 If a suspect was
5. See Nigel Quiroz, Five Facts About Police Deception and Youth You Should Know,
INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 13, 2022), https://innocenceproject.org/police-deception-lyinginterrogations-youth-teenagers [https://perma.cc/4W3D-WRE4].
6. See Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1174 (2001) (“Interrogation typically requires at least some
deception—from professing unfelt sympathy for the suspect, to exaggerating the strength of
the evidence against the suspect, to falsely alleging that a witness has identified the suspect.”).
7. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) (“[O]ne who is innocent will not imperil
his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.”); Patrick M. McMullen,
Comment, Questioning the Questions: The Impermissibility of Police Deception in
Interrogations of Juveniles, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 971, 974 (2005).
8. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
957 (1997).
9. Megan Crane, Laura Nirider & Steven A. Drizin, The Truth About Juvenile False
Confessions, 16 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 10, 12 (2016).
10. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.6 (2022). This Note focuses on the Illinois statute
because the state is the first in the country to effectively ban police deception in juvenile
interrogations.
11. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (holding that whether a
defendant’s will was overborne is determined by the totality of the circumstances, including
“the details of the interrogation”).
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deceived and coerced into making a confession, the incriminating statement
was not a product of the suspect’s “free and unconstrained choice.”12 The
voluntariness of a suspect’s confession, and whether the confession may be
admitted at trial as a result, implicates various constitutional rights.13
Part I.A provides an overview of the constitutional concerns regarding
involuntary confessions and the way in which courts determine whether a
confession was made voluntarily. Part I.B describes the use of police
deception in the context of interrogations and outlines the way in which
courts and legislatures have responded to the use of such tactics.
A. The Law of Confessions
The constitutionality of admitting a defendant’s confession at trial
depends, in part, on whether the confession was made voluntarily.14 The
constitutional requirement that a confession only be used against a defendant
if it was made voluntarily reflects a “complex of values implicated in police
questioning,”15 namely balancing the need for effective law enforcement and
ensuring the fundamental fairness of criminal procedures.16
This focus on fairness is derived from a pair of constitutional guarantees.
First, the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”17 In Bram v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
use of involuntary confessions against a defendant at trial violates their right
against self-incrimination.19
Second, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
also governs the determination of whether a confession was made
voluntarily.20 The due process inquiry examines whether the tactics used to
elicit a confession are “compatible with a system that presumes innocence
and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means,”
such as when a defendant is coerced to confess.21
In light of these constitutional protections, the Supreme Court has
evaluated various techniques utilized by law enforcement to extract
inculpatory statements. For example, the Court has considered the
12. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
13. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (holding that admitting
involuntary confessions at trial violates the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination);
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225–26 (holding that the “ultimate test” in determining whether
admitting confessions into evidence at trial violates due process depends on whether the
confession was made voluntarily).
14. See Bram, 168 U.S. at 542 (Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination);
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225–26 (right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
15. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224–25.
16. See id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
19. See id. at 556.
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985).
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constitutionality of law enforcement’s use of physical torture or
psychological pressure in extracting confessions.22 Although the Court did
not explicitly rule that such practices are unconstitutional, the Court held that
the use of physical torture in interrogations is coercive per se, rendering the
resulting confession inadmissible at trial.23 Other interrogation tactics
involving physical isolation, such as subjecting the suspect to prolonged
interrogations while incommunicado, renders the resulting confession
inadmissible because of the coerciveness of the physical interrogational
pressures.24
Although most interrogation tactics involving physical coercion are
coercive per se, the permissibility of tactics involving more subtle
psychological pressures is unclear. Rather than developing a per se rule
against psychological interrogation techniques, courts instead determine the
admissibility of confessions by assessing the “totality of all the surrounding
circumstances” and whether those circumstances rendered the suspect’s will
to be overborne.25 The totality of the circumstances analysis considers the
suspect’s potential vulnerabilities, such as their age,26 level of education,27
intelligence,28 mental health,29 and physical condition.30 The analysis also
discerns the manner in which the interrogation was conducted (such as the
22. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (applying the totality
of the circumstances test and describing that the factors to be considered include “both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation”).
23. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1952) (“The tendency of the innocent, as
well as the guilty, to risk remote results of a false confession rather than suffer immediate pain
is so strong that judges long ago found it necessary to guard against miscarriages of justice by
treating any confession made concurrently with torture or threat of brutality as too
untrustworthy to be received as evidence of guilt.”), overruled on other grounds sub nom.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 280, 297 (1936)
(holding that confessions procured by physical torture, brutality, and violence are
inadmissible).
24. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 752 (1966) (holding that the defendant’s
confessions were made involuntarily and were coerced by repeated interrogation and isolation
from any outside communications for sixteen days).
25. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (listing the relevant factors and applying the
totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a defendant was coerced into making a
confession).
26. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (finding that a fifteen-year-old
suspect’s “tender and difficult age” renders him “a ready victim of the inquisition”).
27. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561–62, 568 (1958) (holding that the
defendant’s confession was coerced and noting the adult defendant’s fifth-grade education);
see also Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 712 (1967) (considering the adult defendant’s
fifth-grade education as a factor in the totality of the circumstances test).
28. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957) (noting that the defendant
“started school at age eight and left at 16 while still in the third grade”); see also Dassey v.
Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that the defendant’s “limited intellectual
ability” weighs in favor of the involuntariness of the defendant’s confession).
29. See, e.g., Fikes, 352 U.S. at 193 (noting the defendant’s schizophrenic diagnosis in
assessing the totality of the circumstances).
30. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944) (highlighting the
defendant’s deprivation of sleep due to thirty-six hours of consecutive questioning); Reck v.
Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 443 (1961) (noting the defendant’s weak condition and pain due to
physical illness and lack of food).
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length of detention or interrogation),31 whether the defendant was informed
of their constitutional rights,32 and whether police utilized deceptive
tactics.33
Courts utilize the totality of the circumstances analysis to evaluate whether
the resulting confession was the byproduct of an “essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.”34 If the circumstances suggest that the
suspect’s will was overborne and their “capacity for self-determination
critically impaired,”35 the resulting due process violation renders the
confession inadmissible at trial.36 Although a single factor does not
conclusively determine the voluntariness issue, certain factors such as the
suspect’s age and whether the suspect was informed of their constitutional
rights are worth noting here.
First, in Haley v. Ohio,37 the Supreme Court invalidated a minor’s
confession, holding that juvenile confessions should be judged by more
exacting standards than are applied to adult confessions.38 The Haley Court
emphasized that confessions made by minors are different than those made
by adults because minors’ adolescent years are a “period of great instability
which the crisis of adolescence produces.”39 Despite this, the Court still
utilizes the same totality of the circumstances test in determining whether a
juvenile suspect’s confession was made involuntarily.40 However, courts
find that juvenile confessions are involuntary more often than they do for
adult confessions.41
Second, the factor considering whether the suspect is informed of their
constitutional rights was the focus of the Court’s recognition of Miranda
31. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 739 (1966) (finding that, among other
factors, a sixteen-day interrogation contributed to the defendant’s involuntary confession).
32. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (establishing the well-known
Miranda rights and holding that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination”);
see, e.g., Davis, 384 U.S. at 739 (noting that the defendant was not advised of his constitutional
rights by the police before making a confession).
33. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969) (considering the fact that the police
falsely informed defendant that a coconspirator had already confessed as one of the factors in
the totality of the circumstances test).
34. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
38. See id. at 600–01 (“The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration
of his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of
the police towards his rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a
child by means which the law should not sanction.”).
39. Id. at 599.
40. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (listing the relevant factors in
determining the admissibility of a juvenile suspect’s confession, including, among other
things, the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence).
41. See, e.g., In re A.L., 157 N.E.3d 350, 356–57 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) (holding that the
ten-year-old suspect’s confession was made involuntarily); J.G. v. State, 883 So. 2d 915 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the thirteen-year-old defendant’s confession was made
involuntarily).
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rights in Miranda v. Arizona.42 The Court, partially in response to the
widespread use of deception and other subtle psychological tactics in
interrogations,43 established the now ubiquitous Miranda warnings.44
Miranda requires that, “[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney.”45 Due to law enforcement’s consistent compliance with the
Court’s holding in Miranda, courts rarely invalidate confessions when an
adult defendant was properly informed of their Miranda rights.46
Relatedly, in determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver,47 courts
also utilize the totality of the circumstances test to decide whether the waiver
was made voluntarily.48 The voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, though
relevant in determining whether a confession was also made involuntarily, is
a separate issue that is not the focus of this Note. In other words, this Note
primarily discusses the voluntariness of a confession when police deception
is utilized and sets aside the issue of the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver.
B. Police Deception in Interrogations
The use of police deception is also one of the factors examined by courts
in assessing whether a confession was made involuntarily.49 Part I.B.1
canvasses the various types of police deception utilized more broadly by law
enforcement and specifically in the context of interrogations. Part I.B.2
examines how courts analyze the use of police deception in interrogations
and discusses the circumstances in which courts are likely to find that a
confession was involuntary. Part I.B.3 briefly notes the way in which state
legislatures have responded to police deception in interrogations by passing
or introducing legislation limiting the use of such tactics.

42. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. See id. at 448–55 (describing in granular detail the sophisticated and sometimes
deceptive psychological stratagems utilized to induce a confession during interrogations); see
McMullen, supra note 7, at 978–79 (“The [Miranda] decision . . . was motivated in part by
the Court’s frustration with police officers who continually upped the ante of interrogative
pressure by replacing physical coercion with deception and other sophisticated psychological
tactics.”).
44. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
45. Id.
46. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (“We do not suggest that
compliance with Miranda conclusively establishes the voluntariness of a subsequent
confession. But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a
self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement
authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”).
47. Individuals may waive their Miranda rights as long as the waiver is made “voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
48. See, e.g., J.G. v. State, 883 So. 2d 915, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (weighing the
totality of the circumstances and concluding that the defendant involuntarily waived his
Miranda rights).
49. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969) (evaluating the use of police
deceptive tactics as one of the factors in the totality of the circumstances test).
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1. Categories of Police Deception
The police utilize deception in various stages of criminal investigations
and law enforcement, and certain techniques are generally accepted by the
courts.50 For example, courts generally hold that the use of undercover
agents is constitutional, out of a concern that excessive interference with law
enforcement could “severely hamper the Government in ferreting out those
organized criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings with
victims who either cannot or do not protest.”51 Law enforcement officers in
plain uniform may also use deceptive tactics when conducting searches. For
example, uniformed police officers may lead residents to believe that they
are searching the residents’ homes to assist them in a burglary report, when
in fact the purpose of the search is to collect evidence of fraud committed by
the residents.52 Finally, as outlined above, after apprehending a suspect,
officers often use deceptive techniques when interrogating that suspect to
elicit confessions.53
This is not to say, however, that deceptive tactics are entirely immune from
constitutional review.54 Because deceptive tactics during interrogation, for
example, may impact the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession, there are
some general limits on the types of tactics that may be used.55 The types of
deception often made during interrogations may be broadly divided into two
categories: (1) false statements about the procedure or outcome of the
suspect’s case and (2) false representations about evidence.56
In the first bucket, false statements about the procedure or outcome of the
case include false promises of leniency in sentencing, false statements about
the nature of the current interrogation, and false statements about the
maximum penalty the suspect may face if convicted. Interrogators may
falsely promise the suspect leniency if the suspect cooperates or confesses.57
Police officers may also make untrue statements about the current procedures
of the interrogation to put the suspect at ease or to pressure the suspect into
making a confession. For example, interrogators may falsely inform the
50. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (“Artifice and stratagem
may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises.”).
51. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (holding that undercover operations
do not invalidate consent).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Spivey, 861 F.3d 1207, 1210–12, 1215, 1218 (11th Cir.
2017) (holding that law enforcement’s use of pretext to enter and search defendants’ residence
did not invalidate defendants’ consent for them to enter, and therefore the search did not
violate the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure).
53. See, e.g., Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 313 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that
interrogators misrepresenting to the suspect the extent of their knowledge of the alleged crime
is a common interview technique).
54. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 209 (“The various protections of the Bill of Rights, of course,
provide checks upon such official deception for the protection of the individual.”).
55. See supra Part I.A.
56. See McMullen, supra note 7, at 983.
57. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897) (invalidating a confession
made on the basis of a false promise suggesting a “benefit as to the crime and its punishment
as arising from making a statement”).
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suspect that they are being questioned merely as a witness and not as a
suspect,58 or falsely inform a juvenile suspect that they would be considered
an adult for the charges to be brought against them.59 Interrogators may also
falsely inform the suspect of the maximum sentence that they may face if
convicted of the charge against them.60 For example, in one case,
interrogators falsely informed a seventeen-year-old suspect that he may face
the death penalty61 for his involvement in the alleged offense.62
The second bucket of deceptive tactics involves false representations of
evidence. These deceptive tactics include verbal misrepresentations of
evidence, such as falsely informing the suspect that a co-suspect admitted to
the alleged offense.63 Verbal misrepresentations may also include false
statements that the victim of the offense directly identified the suspect as the
assailant,64 or that DNA evidence was found at the scene and matches the
suspect’s DNA.65 Misrepresentations of evidence may also take the form of
physically presenting false evidence. For example, in one case, interrogators
presented to the suspect fabricated documents showing the suspect’s guilt.66
In rare but notable cases, personal relationships between the interrogator
and the suspect influence the use and effectiveness of deceptive tactics. For
example, one suspect confessed to an alleged offense after his childhood
friend, one of the police officers assisting in the interrogation, falsely told the
suspect that the suspect had gotten him “in a lot of trouble” for committing
the offense and not confessing.67 In another case, an interrogator had “strong

58. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 151 N.E.3d 367, 379–80 (Mass. 2020) (holding
that the deceptive tactic used did not affect the voluntariness of the suspect’s statement).
59. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 756 S.E.2d 924, 929–30 (Va. Ct. App. 2014) (holding
that such “misrepresentation does not rise to the level of such deliberate deception or coercion”
that would compel a suspect to involuntarily confess).
60. See, e.g., In re D.F., 38 N.E.3d 1202, 1212 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (holding that falsely
informing a thirteen-year-old suspect that he would be sentenced as an adult and receive a
twenty-eight-year prison sentence is “intentionally misleading and constitutes deceptive
conduct” that undermined the voluntariness of the suspect’s resulting statements).
61. The Supreme Court struck down the juvenile death penalty as unconstitutional in
2005. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
62. See State v. Kerby, No. 03-CA-55, 2007 WL 127727, at *11–12 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan.
19, 2007) (holding that law enforcement falsely informing a juvenile suspect that they may be
sentenced to death for the alleged offense rendered the juvenile suspect’s confession
involuntary).
63. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969) (false statement to a suspect
that a co-suspect confessed to the alleged offense).
64. See, e.g., Farmah v. State, 789 S.W.2d 665, 672 (Tex. App. 1990) (discussing police’s
false representation that the suspect had been identified by the victim).
65. See, e.g., People v. Minniti, 867 N.E.2d 1237, 1250 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (interrogator’s
misrepresentation to the suspect that the suspect’s DNA was found inside the victim),
abrogated on other grounds sub nom. People v. Bailey, 4 N.E.3d 474 (Ill. 2014).
66. See, e.g., State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (false
documents indicating that a scientific test established that the semen stains found on victim’s
clothing came from suspect).
67. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 319, 323 (1959) (deception by the suspect’s
childhood friend, who was the “one face visible to [the suspect] in which [the suspect] could
put some trust”).
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personal motives to [use deceptive tactics to] elicit a confession”68 from a
juvenile suspect because the victim of the alleged offense was the daughter
of the interrogator’s life partner.69
2. Courts’ Analysis of Police Deception in Interrogations
This section outlines how courts analyze the constitutionality of the
various forms of police deception outlined above. Courts consider whether
the interrogator’s statement was actually untruthful or an immaterial
misrepresentation, whether the deception actually caused the suspect’s will
to be overborne and confess involuntarily, and the extent to which the tactic
used is more or less concerning than other types.
At the outset, courts often struggle to demarcate the line between
immaterial misrepresentation and deception, either by gauging the falseness
of the statement or by examining the purpose of the false statement. In the
first instance, one court found that the police’s statement to the suspect that
there were “several” witnesses implicating the suspect in the alleged
offense—when there were really only two—was insufficient to “transform
the interrogation tactic into trickery.”70 In determining the purpose of the
false statement by the police, courts tend to conclude that a false statement
does not constitute deception rendering a confession involuntary if the
purpose of the statement was to put the suspect at ease71 or to induce the
suspect to admit to their involvement in the offense.72
Another important aspect of police deception jurisprudence involves
causation—that is, whether the suspect confessed because of the police’s
deceptive statements. In other words, the court examines whether the
misrepresentation undermined the voluntariness of the suspect’s
statements.73
Based on this framework, courts examine whether false statements about
procedure or the outcome of the suspect’s case, or false representations about
the evidence render a confession involuntary. First, the Supreme Court in
Bram v. United States barred the use of false promises of leniency, holding
that confessions obtained as a result of false promises of lenient punishment

68. J.G. v. State, 883 So. 2d 915, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
69. See id.
70. In re Marvin M., 890 N.E.2d 984, 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
71. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 151 N.E.3d 367, 379–80 (Mass. 2020) (“Although
we do not condone deception designed to give a defendant a false sense of security,
particularly a defendant who is a minor, here, given the other factors present, the officers’
deception cannot be said to have affected the voluntariness of his statement.”).
72. See, e.g., Farmah v. State, 789 S.W.2d 665, 672 (Tex. App. 1990) (“[The interrogator]
testified that the purpose of his false representation to appellant was to get him to admit his
involvement in the offense . . . . We hold that the trial court . . . did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the confession was voluntary.”).
73. See, e.g., In re D.F., 38 N.E.3d 1202, 1212 (Ohio 2015) (finding that police deception
regarding the maximum sentence that the thirteen-year-old suspect may face undermined the
voluntariness of the juvenile suspect’s statements).
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were involuntary.74 In Bram, the promise was directly related to the
defendant’s sentence and “was calculated to produce on the mind of the
accused . . . a suggestion of some benefit as to the crime and its punishment
as arising from making a statement.”75
Lower courts, however, have not interpreted Bram as creating a categorical
bar on the police’s use of false promises of leniency. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, distinguishes false promises of
leniency pertaining to imminent criminal proceedings from those related to
collateral matters, holding that the latter does not render confessions
involuntary per se.76 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also
distinguishes between a direct promise of nonprosecution and a deceptive
tactic resulting in a suspect’s mistaken belief that they may possibly not be
prosecuted, holding that the latter does not render a confession involuntary.77
The Eighth Circuit has also declined to extend Bram in holding that, as long
as a suspect knew the risks of confessing, false promises of leniency do not
necessarily render the confession involuntary.78
Second, courts have generally authorized the use of verbal
misrepresentations of evidence to pressure the suspect to confess79 but have
proscribed the use of fabricated physical evidence.80 Therefore, the use of
verbal deceptive tactics—such as falsely informing the suspect that a
co-suspect already confessed,81 that the victim of the offense directly
identified the suspect as the assailant,82 or that DNA evidence was found at
the scene and matches the suspect’s DNA83—are not grounds to invalidate
74. 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897) (“But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be
free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any
improper influence.” (quoting 3 WILLIAM O. RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS 478 (Horace Smith & A.P. Perceval Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896) (1819))).
75. Id. at 564–65.
76. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 608–10 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that a
detective telling a suspect that his mental illness rendered him not responsible for his actions,
promising psychiatric help, and implying that the suspect would not be prosecuted, is a
promise related to a collateral matter and thus does not render a confession involuntary).
77. See, e.g., United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 725 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that the
police did not make a direct promise of leniency despite the recorded statement “[i]f [the
killing of the victim was] spontaneous and that’s the truth, you will not be prosecuted”).
78. See United States v. Astello, 241 F.3d 965, 967–68 (8th Cir. 2001).
79. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (holding that the police’s false
statement to a suspect that a co-suspect confessed to the alleged offenses did not render the
suspect’s subsequent confession involuntary).
80. See, e.g., State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 973–74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that showing the suspect false documents to pressure him to confess “offends our traditional
notions of due process of law” and renders the confession involuntary).
81. See, e.g., Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739.
82. See, e.g., Farmah v. State, 789 S.W.2d 665, 672 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that the
police’s false representation that the suspect had been identified by the victim did not render
the resulting confession involuntary).
83. See, e.g., People v. Minniti, 867 N.E.2d 1237, 1250 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that
the interrogator’s lie to the suspect that his DNA was found inside the victim does not render
the suspect’s confession involuntary), abrogated on other grounds sub nom. People v. Bailey,
4 N.E.3d 474 (Ill. 2014).
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resulting confessions.
In contrast, showing deliberately fabricated
documents to a suspect during an interrogation crosses the line and partially
results in the inadmissibility of a resulting confession.84
Although the use of deception during interrogation is one of the factors
weighed in the totality of the circumstances test,85 the presence or absence of
deception does not conclusively determine the admissibility of a resulting
confession.86 In Moran v. Burbine,87 although the Supreme Court stated that
some instances of police deception may be so “egregious . . . [so as to] rise
to a level of a due process violation,”88 the Court did not specify the types of
police deception that may undermine due process and its fundamental idea
of fairness.89 Since Moran, the Court has repeatedly declined to draw
specific limits on police use of deceptive tactics during interrogations.90
Because Moran provides little guidance for understanding whether law
enforcement’s deception violates due process, courts continue to apply the
totality of the circumstances test where the presence of deception is but one
factor in determining whether the suspect’s will was overborne.91
At least one state, however, follows a separate test to determine whether
the use of police deception renders a confession involuntary. In Texas, police
deception renders a resulting confession involuntary if the tactic was
“calculated to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due
process.”92 For example, the court in Harty v. State93 used this test to hold
that a deceptive statement that a defendant’s polygraph evaluation would
84. See Cayward, 552 So. 2d at 973–74 (false documents indicating that a scientific test
established that semen stains found on victim’s clothing came from suspect).
85. See supra Part I.B.2.
86. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (“The significant fact about
all of these decisions [on the admissibility of confessions] is that none of them turned on the
presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the
surrounding circumstances.”).
87. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
88. Id. at 432.
89. See id. at 433–34 (holding that police lying to the suspect’s attorney that they would
not be questioning the suspect and failing to inform the attorney that her client was also being
questioned as a murder suspect “falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the
sensibilities of civilized society,” but declining to specify what factors may rise to that level).
But see id. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Police [deception and] interference with
communications between an attorney and his client violates the due process requirement of
fundamental fairness.”).
90. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 607–08 (3d Cir. 1985) (lying to the suspect
that the victim had not yet died when she already had, and lying again several hours later that
she had just died to produce an emotional response in the suspect and induce him to confess),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1089 (3d Cir.
1989) (deception in making the suspect think that the evidence against her was stronger than
it actually was), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990); Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 313
(7th Cir. 2017) (deception in making the juvenile suspect think that the police already knew
what had happened when in fact they did not), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2677 (2018).
91. See supra Part I.B.2.
92. Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc) (emphasis
added); see also In re A.M., 333 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. App. 2011) (emphasis added) (applying
the Creager test and rejecting the suspect’s claim that the police’s false promise not to disclose
his polygraph examination results to the prosecutor was offensive to due process).
93. 229 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App. 2007).
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only be provided to the defendant’s therapist was not likely to induce an
involuntary confession because the defendant did “not have anything to gain
by making false statements, regardless of whether the statements were
disclosed to his therapist alone.”94 The Harty court also held that the same
misrepresentation was not offensive to due process because it was
insufficient “to cause [the defendant’s] will to be overborne.”95
3. Statutes Regulating Police Deception in Interrogations
Only two states have passed legislation barring police deception in
interrogations. In 2021, Illinois governor J.B. Pritzker signed into law a
historic statute prohibiting police deception in juvenile interrogations.96
Under the Illinois law, the use of police deception creates a presumption that
a resulting statement by a juvenile suspect is inadmissible as evidence, but
that the presumption may be overcome by “a preponderance of the evidence
that the statement was voluntarily given, based on the totality of the
circumstances.”97
That same year, Oregon governor Kate Brown also signed into law
legislation prohibiting law enforcement from using deception when
interrogating suspects under the age of eighteen.98 Like the Illinois law, the
Oregon statute creates a rebuttable presumption that a juvenile’s confession
is inadmissible if police use deception to elicit it.99
Also in 2021, New York state senator Zellnor Myrie proposed a more
comprehensive bill that would render any adult or juvenile suspect’s
94. Id. at 856–57 (“If the admissions were disclosed only to his therapist, false admissions
would have given the therapist incorrect information in formulating [the defendant]’s
treatment and thus would likely decrease any benefit [the defendant] was receiving from the
treatment. If the admissions were disclosed to authorities, false admissions of violations
would clearly be against [defendant]’s interest. So, in either event, [the defendant] was not
influenced to speak untruthfully.”).
95. Id. at 856.
96. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.6 (2022); see Illinois Becomes the First State to Ban
Police from Lying to Juveniles During Interrogations, INNOCENCE PROJECT (July 15, 2021),
https://innocenceproject.org/illinois-first-state-to-ban-police-lying/ [https://perma.cc/3HLUBMW5].
97. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.6 (2022).
98. 2012 Or. Laws 487; Oregon Deception Bill Is Signed into Law, Banning Police from
Lying to Youth During Interrogations, INNOCENCE PROJECT (July 14, 2021),
https://innocenceproject.org/deception-bill-passes-oregon-legislature-banning-police-fromlying-to-youth-during-interrogations/ [https://perma.cc/2CFX-KUF4].
99. The Oregon statute reads:
A statement made by a person during a custodial interview conducted by a peace
officer is presumed to be involuntary if the person is under 18 years of age and the
statement is made in connection with an investigation into a misdemeanor or a
felony, or an allegation that the person being interviewed committed an act that, if
committed by an adult would constitute a misdemeanor or a felony, and the court
determines that the peace officer intentionally used information known by the
officer to be false to elicit the statement. This presumption may be overcome if the
state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the statement was voluntary and
not made in response to the false information used by the peace officer to elicit the
statement.
2012 Or. Laws 487.
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confession inadmissible if it resulted from false representations of evidence
or from a statement that undermines the reliability of the defendant’s
confession.100 At the time of this Note’s publication, however, this bill is
still in committee and faces many obstacles before potential enactment.101
II. CRITICISMS AND DEFENSES OF POLICE DECEPTION IN INTERROGATIONS
The debate regarding the propriety of deceptive tactics used by police
during interrogations traditionally focuses on the interrogations of adult
suspects.102 The psychological and neurobiological vulnerabilities of
minors, however, create additional concerns when evaluating whether a per
se bar of police deception is necessary.103 Part II.A and Part II.B canvass the
criticisms and defenses of deceptive tactics used in interrogating adult
suspects. Part II.C then discusses the debate in the context of juvenile
suspects.
A. Criticisms
Opponents of deceptive tactics in interrogations first emphasize that the
long-held assumption that “suspects will not confess to crimes they did not
commit” is a myth.104 In fact, a suspect may falsely confess for a multitude
of reasons. A suspect may engage in (rational) decision-making and confess
“whenever the costs of confession as he perceives them are outweighed by
the benefits of confession, regardless of his culpability.”105 The suspect may
also succumb to the psychological pressure generated by sophisticated and,

100. S.B. S324A, 2021–2022, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021). The proposed bill states that a
defendant’s statement is involuntarily made when it is obtained:
(a) By any person by the use or threatened use of physical force upon the
defendant or another person, or by means of any other improper conduct or undue
pressure which impaired the defendant’s physical or mental condition to the extent
of undermining his or her ability to make a choice whether or not to make a
statement; or
(b) By a public servant engaged in law enforcement activity or by a person then
acting under his or her direction or in cooperation with him or her . . . .
Id. § 1.
101. See Rocco Parascandola, Proposed N.Y. Legislation Would Ban Police Tactic of Lying
to Suspects to Get a Confession, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 8, 2021, 6:03 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/ny-ny-bill-ban-police-lyinginterrogation-20210308-jxcppdatdvcgtkneng2uxirp6i-story.html
[https://perma.cc/N5LAXQX2] (“Myrie’s bill has 13 sponsors but is still awaiting legislative action and is a long way
from passage.”).
102. See infra Parts II.A–B.
103. See infra Part II.C.
104. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 492 (1998) (“The sixty false confessions described in this
article dispel the myth promoted by interrogation manual authors and police trainers that the
psychological interrogation methods they advocate do not cause suspects to confess to crimes
they did not commit. In fact, the opposite is true.”).
105. Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for A Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering
the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 817 (2006).
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at times, coercive interrogation tactics.106 In particular, minors and suspects
with mental health issues are more likely to falsely confess than the average
adult suspect due to these psychologically coercive pressures.107
Furthermore, the use of deceptive tactics may generate an unreliable
confession coerced from a suspect and may even result in a false confession.
Confessions “substantially bias[] the trier of fact’s evaluation of the case in
favor of prosecution and conviction, even when the defendant’s
uncorroborated confession was elicited by coercive methods and other case
evidence strongly supports his innocence.”108 The risk of false confessions
as a result of deceptive interrogation tactics hampers the jury’s ability to
administer justice and threatens the integrity of the legal system at large.109
In determining whether police trickery violates due process, Professor
Welsh S. White proposed the prohibition of interrogation practices that are
“substantially likely to produce untrustworthy statements.”110 Professor
White argued that empirical data supports prohibiting interrogators from
using threats or promises or misrepresenting the evidence against the
suspect.111
Commentators who favor prohibiting or limiting the use of police
deception suggest that such prohibitions will also enhance effective law
enforcement because such regulations may result in “an increase in
law-abiding behavior by community-members stemming from a perception
of a fair system . . . [and] an increased ability of law enforcement to combat
crime because of new cooperation between citizens and their
government.”112 This conclusion stems from the idea that deceptive
interrogation practices in turn breed distrust in law enforcement and hinder
106. See Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation
Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1231 (2001) (“In many cases, the pressure generated by an
interrogation technique and the likelihood that the technique will produce untrustworthy
statements will be substantially equivalent.”).
107. Although the debate on whether and how frequently adult suspects will admit to
crimes they did not commit is far from settled, commentators generally agree that minors are
more likely to falsely confess. For example, Professor Laurie Magid, the leading proponent
of police deceptive tactics, acknowledged that “juveniles . . . appear somewhat more likely
than the average suspect to give a false confession.” Magid, supra note 6, at 1192.
108. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 104, at 491–92.
109. See id. at 496 (“The sixty cases [of false confessions] discussed in this article illustrate
that when there is no independent evidence against a defendant and only a factually inaccurate
confession, the risk of justice miscarrying is so great that the case should never be allowed to
proceed to trial.”).
110. White, supra note 106, at 1247.
111. See id. at 1243 (“Misrepresentations relating to forensic or scientific evidence are
particularly likely to convince suspects that further resistance is futile. Most people believe
that evidence obtained through accepted scientific procedures—fingerprints, ballistic reports,
or DNA evidence, for example—is not only reliable, but irrefutable. Empirical data support
this conclusion.”).
112. Susan R. Klein, Transparency and Truth During Custodial Interrogations and
Beyond, 97 B.U. L. REV. 993, 1039–40 (2017); see also Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A.
Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 9 (1992); Julia
Simon-Kerr, Public Trust and Police Deception, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 625, 677 (2019) (“More
salient, however, is the possibility that deceptive interrogation will remain an impediment to
trust in the police in the communities that could most benefit from such trust.”).
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effective interactions between citizens and the police.113 Therefore, clear
limits on the use of police deception will reduce the “likelihood that the
suspect will be reluctant to trust the interrogator’s assurances.”114 The
concerns that deceptive interrogation practices generate distrust in law
enforcement are amplified by the already high levels of public distrust in
police.115
B. Defenses
In contrast, defenders of deceptive police tactics during interrogations
maintain that an innocent person will not confess to a crime that they did not
commit.116 Proponents of police deceptive tactics argue that even if an
innocent person falsely confesses, the proportion of wrongful convictions
resulting from false confessions are relatively low.117 In addition,
proponents point out that police deception by itself rarely causes false
confessions.118 Rather, “deception must be combined with a lengthy
interrogation during which the police convince the suspect that a confession
is the only way to escape an intolerably stressful situation.”119 Therefore,
proponents argue that it is unnecessary to categorically bar deceptive tactics
based on false confession concerns.
Furthermore, proponents argue that the risk of eliciting a false confession
from a suspect is less weighty than the risks of “losing” a truthful confession
by restricting routine police interrogation tactics.120 Existing research that
documents the harm of false confessions is also “entirely anecdotal and
focuses on the causes, not the scope, of the problem.”121 Because of the lack
of statistically significant evidence documenting the overall frequency of
false confessions,122 proscribing the use of deceptive tactics during
113. See Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 425, 458–59 (1996) (“As knowledge of police lying spreads, trust of police will decrease
and citizens will be less likely to come forward and talk honestly with police. Critical evidence
may remain undiscovered or undisclosed.”); Simon-Kerr, supra note 112, at 677.
114. Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 3, 63
(1995).
115. See Aimee Ortiz, Confidence in Police Is at Record Low, Gallup Survey Finds, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/gallup-poll-police.html
[https://perma.cc/3LCS-SW82]; Skolnick & Leo, supra note 112.
116. See Hopt v. People, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884) (“[O]ne who is innocent will not imperil
his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement.”).
117. See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 502 (1998) (estimating
that the number of wrongful convictions due to false confessions lies somewhere between
1 in 2,400 convictions and 1 in 90,000 convictions).
118. See Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1275, 1290
(2007).
119. Id.
120. Cassell, supra note 117, at 502 (arguing that restricting routine police interrogation
tactics increases the risks of failing to gather truthful confessions to uncover crimes and
“releasing dangerous criminals to commit other crimes”).
121. Magid, supra note 6, at 1190.
122. The lack of reliable statistics exists because “(1) no organization collects statistics on
the annual number of interrogations and confessions or evaluates the reliability of confession
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interrogations may only create more risks to the innocent public123 and would
unjustifiably overturn “long-standing, traditional common law rules.”124
Finally, proponents of the use of police deception in interrogations also
highlight the significance of interrogations as an effective
information-gathering tool for collecting evidence and for solving the factual
uncertainties of a crime.125 At the interrogation stage, law enforcement
particularly values eliciting a confession from the suspect because of a
confession’s insurmountable utility in securing a conviction.126 Proponents
therefore argue that, to induce a desired confession, interrogations often
involve and require at least some form of deception.127 Deceptive tactics are
also necessary in interrogations because the “inherent pressures of custodial
interrogation usually are insufficient by themselves to produce the desired
confession.”128 Furthermore, deceptive practices allow the interrogator to
build a rapport with the suspect129 and to put the suspect at ease to facilitate
questioning and therefore promote effective law enforcement.130
C. Special Considerations for Juveniles
Whether law enforcement’s use of deceptive tactics in interrogations of
juvenile suspects should be subject to any limitations also raises related but
contextually unique questions when compared to interrogations of adult
suspects. This section canvasses the debate regarding the constitutionality of
police deception in juvenile interrogations, whether juvenile suspects are
more likely to falsely confess because of police deception, and the other
public policy concerns that arise in that context.
Like in police deception cases involving adult suspects,131 courts analyze
police deception cases involving juvenile suspects by evaluating whether a
resulting confession was made involuntarily rather than whether the use of
statements; (2) most interrogations leading to disputed confessions are not recorded; and (3)
the ground truth (what really happened) may remain in genuine dispute.” Leo & Ofshe, supra
note 104, at 431–32.
123. See Cassell, supra note 117.
124. Miller W. Shealy, Jr., The Hunting of Man: Lies, Damn Lies, and Police
Interrogations, 4 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 21, 69 (2014).
125. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 72 (2016) (arguing that
prohibiting or restricting police deception would “massively impact many forms of vital police
investigation”).
126. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 104, at 429 (“Because a confession is universally treated
as damning and compelling evidence of guilt, it is likely to dominate all other case evidence
and lead a trier of fact to convict the defendant.”).
127. See Magid, supra note 6, at 1174.
128. Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator
and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 674–75 (1986) (reviewing FRED E.
INBAU, JOHN E. REID & JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d
ed. 1986)).
129. See Magid, supra note 6, at 1168.
130. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 151 N.E.3d 367, 379 (Mass. 2020) (holding that the
police deception in that case did not affect the voluntariness of the suspect’s statement because
the purpose of the deception was to put the suspect at ease “rather than ratcheting up the
pressure of the conversation”).
131. See supra Part II.A.
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police deception itself is constitutionally suspect.132 In determining the
voluntariness of a juvenile suspect’s confession, courts apply the same
standard used for adults by examining whether the totality of the
circumstances caused the suspect’s will to be overborne.133 In addition, law
enforcement’s use of deception is only one of the factors weighed in the
totality of the circumstances test134 and is not dispositive of the due process
question.135
Texas state courts, however, have ruled that “[t]rickery or deception may
render a statement involuntary if ‘the method was calculated to produce an
untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.’”136 Although this
standard theoretically allows for the fact of calculated police deception itself
to render a confession involuntary, in practice, courts still tend to focus on
how the deception impacts the confession (rather than on the deception itself)
in evaluating due process violations.
Absent clear federal or state court precedent holding that the use of police
deception is unconstitutional, commentators advocate for a legislative, per se
bar on deception in juvenile interrogations rooted in the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.137 The concern about false confessions
resulting from deceptive tactics is bolstered in the context of juvenile
interrogations. Neurobiological and psychological studies repeatedly cited
by the Supreme Court highlight the way in which minors are less competent
decision-makers and are “more vulnerable . . . to the influence of coercive
circumstances . . . such as provocation, duress, or threat.”138
132. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 710–11, 724–25 (1979) (examining
whether the sixteen-year-old suspect confessed involuntarily); see also People v. Murdock,
979 N.E.2d 74, 76, 86 (Ill. 2012) (holding that “[t]he absence of [police] trickery weighs in
favor of voluntariness” of the sixteen-year-old suspect’s confession); Lopez, 151 N.E.3d at
379–80 (holding that law enforcement’s deception did not adversely affect the voluntariness
of the seventeen-year-old suspect’s confessions).
133. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600–01 (1948) (considering the
fifteen-year-old suspect’s age, the duration of the interrogation, the lack of counsel, and the
police’s callous attitude, and holding that the suspect’s confession was made involuntarily).
134. See, e.g., Michael C., 442 U.S. at 726–27 (noting that the absence of police trickery
or deceit weighed in favor of voluntariness).
135. See, e.g., In re Marvin M., 890 N.E.2d 984, 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“[P]olice
trickery or deception will not invalidate a minor’s statement as a matter of law, but is only one
factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances.”).
136. In re A.M., 333 S.W.3d 411, 417–18 (Tex. App. 2011) (considering whether leading
the juvenile suspect to believe that his polygraph examination results would not be disclosed
to the prosecutor was offensive to due process (citing Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc))).
137. See, e.g., McMullen, supra note 7, at 1005 (“A system of investigation which takes
advantage of the weaknesses inherent in youth and inexperience is completely at odds with
this fundamental right.”); see also Ariel Spierer, Note, The Right to Remain a Child: The
Impermissibility of the Reid Technique in Juvenile Interrogations, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719,
1743 (2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court should hold that the Reid Technique, which
utilizes deceptive tactics, violates juvenile defendants’ Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination).
138. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Development Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCH. 1009, 1011 (2003); see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (citing the study
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Such psychological vulnerabilities are linked to the early stage of
adolescent neurobiological development.139
Minors are particularly
sensitive to negative feedback from authority figures and are likely to “alter[]
their answers merely to agree with the interviewer” and therefore may change
their accounts to match those that the police provide.140 Such eagerness to
please authority figures partially results from the firm trust that minors place
on people in authority141 and “[their] belie[f] that they should never disobey
authority.”142 Coupled with this desire to please authority is the tendency of
youth to weigh immediate consequences heavier than long-term
consequences.143 A desire to immediately avoid the pressure of the
interrogation may therefore lead a juvenile suspect to falsely confess to a
crime.144 Accordingly, research suggests that minors are two to three times
more likely to falsely confess than adults are.145 Even one of the strongest
proponents of police deceptive tactics concedes that juveniles appear “more
likely than the average suspect to give a false confession.”146
Categorically barring the use of police deception in juvenile interrogation
raises line-drawing concerns as well because the conventional age
differentiating a juvenile defendant from an adult defendant, eighteen, is
often perceived as arbitrary and not reflective of neurobiological maturity.147
Some neurobiological evidence suggests that twenty-one or twenty-two is
closer to the biological age of maturity.148

by Professors Steinberg and Scott in holding that mandatory juvenile life without parole
sentences are unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (also citing the
Steinberg & Scott study to highlight youth’s vulnerability and susceptibility to negative
influences in holding that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional).
139. See Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A
Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 323 (2006) (“The frontal cortex has been
shown to play a major role in the performance of executive functions including short term or
working memory, motor set and planning, attention, inhibitory control and decision making.”).
140. G. Richardson, G.H. Gudjonsson & T.P. Kelly, Interrogative Suggestibility in an
Adolescent Forensic Population, 18 J. ADOLESCENCE 211, 215 (1995).
141. See Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions
Regarding Juvenile Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 757,
764 (2007).
142. Saul M. Kassin, Steven A. Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Richard A.
Leo & Allison D. Redlich, Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations,
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 8 (2010).
143. See id. (“Studies have also shown that [the youth] are more likely to decide . . . on the
basis of the potential for immediate negative consequences—for example, whether they will
be permitted to go home if they waive their rights—rather than considering the longer-range
consequences associated with penalties for a delinquency adjudication.”).
144. See id. at 9.
145. See Crane et al., supra note 9, at 12.
146. See Magid, supra note 6, at 1192.
147. See, e.g., David E. Arredondo, Child Development, Children’s Mental Health and the
Juvenile Justice System: Principles for Effective Decision-Making, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
13, 15 (2003) (“[C]hronological age is a poor index of neurobiological and emotional
maturity.”).
148. See ADAM ORTIZ, JUV. JUST. CTR., AM. BAR ASS’N, ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN
DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL CULPABILITY 2 (2004), https://capitalpunishmentincontext.org/
files/resources/juveniles/adolescencecopy.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL4E-XTBB].
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III. STATE LEGISLATION CATEGORICALLY BARRING THE USE OF POLICE
DECEPTION IN JUVENILE INTERROGATIONS
Police deception should be categorically barred in juvenile interrogations
through state legislation, regardless of whether the deception produced an
involuntary or even false confession. Part III.A discusses the Supreme
Court’s recognition of the psychological vulnerability of minors through its
juvenile protection jurisprudence and argues that the same rationale should
extend to bar police deception in juvenile interrogations. Part III.B then
explains why state legislation should be used as the mode for reform and
describes how model legislation may look.
A. Extending the Juvenile-Protection Rationale to the Prohibition of Police
Deception
The psychological immaturity of minors heavily factored into the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on cruel and unusual punishment,
which bars capital punishment149 and mandatory life without parole
sentences for juvenile offenders.150 In other words, the highest court of the
land consistently recognizes that “children are different” from adults and
should be subject to less harsh punishment; youth are immature and reckless,
more susceptible to outside influences, and still forming their characters.151
Similarly, the psychological susceptibility and suggestibility of minors put
them in vulnerable positions when faced with lies told by the police,
undermining the fundamental fairness afforded by due process.152 Minors
are more susceptible to negative feedback and are more likely to alter their
accounts simply to please authority.153 The inability to accurately weigh
long-term consequences and make rational choices “can lead to poor
149. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of
18 when their crimes were committed.”).
150. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (“We therefore hold that mandatory
life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”).
151. See, e.g., id. at 479 (“By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to
imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment.”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010) (“Difficulty in
weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust
defense counsel, seen as part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to poor
decisions by one charged with a juvenile offense.”); Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569–70
(“[S]usceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior . . . [and their]
vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean
juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative
influences in their whole environment.”). These cases and many like them constitute what is
often called the Court’s “children are different” jurisprudence. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott,
“Children Are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
71 (2013); Robin Walker Sterling, “Children Are Different”: Implicit Bias, Rehabilitation,
and the “New” Juvenile Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1019 (2013).
152. See supra Part II.C.
153. See Jessica Owen-Kostelnik, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jessica R. Meyer, Testimony and
Interrogation of Minors: Assumptions About Maturity and Morality, 61 AM. PSYCH. 286, 292
(2006).
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decisions by one charged with a juvenile offense.”154 Such poor decisions
too often include the choice to falsely confess.155
Although the exact frequency of false confessions made by adult suspects
and the scope of their harms are unclear,156 there is a consensus that, at the
very least, juvenile suspects are more likely than adults to falsely confess.157
Therefore, at least in the context of juvenile interrogations, the police’s use
of deceptive tactics substantially increases the risk that juveniles confess to
crimes they did not commit, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.158
Some argue against an absolute bar on police deception because other
factors surrounding the interrogation, such as the length of detention or
interrogation, may still result in involuntary or false confessions.159 Indeed,
the procedural protections in place for juvenile interrogations limit the length
of interrogation to reduce some pressures by providing a more “comfortable”
questioning environment.160 Some states require the interrogation to be
videotaped.161 These protections, however, do not incentivize the police to
refrain from deceiving a minor in the interrogation room. In fact, as
portrayed in Making a Murderer, even with the protections afforded to
sixteen-year-old Brendan Dassey, the interrogators still engaged in deceptive
questioning that arguably led Dassey to falsely confess.162 Although
Dassey’s interrogation “took place in a comfortable setting, without any
physical coercion or intimidation, without even raised voices, and over a
relatively brief time,” the investigators nonetheless asked deceptive, leading
questions to steer Dassey into confessing.163
Even if a juvenile suspect does not falsely confess, the use of deceptive
tactics against psychologically vulnerable minors in and of itself undermines
the fundamental fairness of the juvenile justice system and violates the Due
Process Clause. The fact that a police officer—an authority figure whom
minors trust and seek to appease164—may lie to a minor to conveniently elicit
a confession offends the traditional notions of due process, which guarantees
the fundamental fairness of criminal procedures as prescribed by the U.S.
Constitution.165 To prevent injustice, the courts’ “children are different”
jurisprudence should extend to the sphere of interrogations and invalidate the
use of police deception in juvenile interrogations.
154. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78.
155. See generally Crane et al., supra note 9.
156. See supra note 122.
157. One of the most prominent supporters of police deception, Professor Magid admits
that juveniles are “more likely than the average suspect to give a false confession.” See Magid,
supra note 6, at 1192.
158. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 104, at 493–94.
159. See generally supra Part I.A.
160. See Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 301, 314 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that the
interrogation of the juvenile lasted a relatively brief time and that the juvenile was physically
comfortable as “he sat on a sofa and was offered food, drink, and restroom breaks”).
161. See Kelly, supra note 1.
162. See Dassey, 877 F.3d at 301; Liptak, supra note 1.
163. Dassey, 877 F.3d at 301, 323.
164. See Meyer & Reppucci, supra note 141.
165. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986).
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B. State Legislation Categorically Barring Police Deception
The judicial totality of the circumstances test in evaluating the
admissibility of confessions fails to adequately protect juvenile suspects from
the due process harms of police deception.166 The Supreme Court’s
traditional analysis only weeds out the most egregious cases arising out of
rare circumstances, such as when the juvenile suspect is particularly young.
For example, a ten-year-old suspect’s confession was invalidated after the
police deceived him into believing that his father consented to his
interrogation and that he would be released if he confessed.167 In J.G. v.
State,168 the court invalidated a thirteen-year-old suspect’s confession
resulting from an interrogator’s lie that law enforcement had videotapes of
the suspect inappropriately touching the victim.169 In addition, the court
noted that the interrogator had “strong personal motives to elicit a
confession” from the suspect because the interrogator “considered the victim
to be like a daughter.”170 In People v. Bentley,171 the court invalidated a
fourteen-year-old suspect’s confession because the police deception limited
the suspect’s access to his parents and infringed on the suspect’s right to
counsel.172 In contrast, courts have rarely invalidated confessions made by
older juvenile suspects.173
Given the inadequacy of the totality of the circumstances test,174 and the
reality that juvenile criminal proceedings are largely state matters, state
legislatures should pass laws categorically prohibiting the use of police
deception in juvenile interrogations.175
Although the laws recently passed in Illinois176 and in Oregon177 represent
a historic moment as the first state legislation to limit police deception,
neither law categorically bars the use of police deception in juvenile

166. See supra Part II.C.
167. See In re A.L., 157 N.E.3d 350, 356–57 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).
168. 883 So. 2d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
169. See id. at 925–26.
170. Id. at 926.
171. 587 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1992).
172. See id. at 543–44 (“[If] . . . the effect of the police conduct through trickery is to insure
that a juvenile offender’s parent with the information necessary for an informed decision
whether to obtain a lawyer is kept from access to the child . . . the police conduct crosses the
line.”).
173. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 151 N.E.3d 367, 379 n.12, 380 (Mass. 2020)
(holding that a seventeen-year-old suspect’s statements were voluntarily made).
174. See supra Part I.B.2.
175. Professor Tonja Jacobi also suggests that it is “inappropriate for the [c]ourt[s] to be
the arbiter of acceptable practices . . . but it is one that is appropriate for broad-based reform
of police manuals and training . . . [with] legislative or administrative oversight.” Jacobi,
supra note 125, at 73. In contrast, Professor Welsh S. White suggested that courts should limit
the use of police deception by replacing the due process voluntariness test with a test that
prohibits deception that is “substantially likely to produce untrustworthy statements.” White,
supra note 106, at 1237.
176. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.6 (2022).
177. 2012 Or. Laws 487.
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interrogations.178 Instead, Illinois’s law states that the use of police
deception creates a presumption that a resulting statement by the juvenile
suspect is inadmissible as evidence, but that the presumption may be
overcome by “a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was
voluntarily given, based on the totality of the circumstances.”179 Similarly,
Oregon’s statute creates a rebuttable presumption that “may be overcome if
the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
voluntary and not made in response to the false information used by the peace
officer to elicit the statement.”180 Because both laws were passed in 2021,
however, it is too early to conclude whether the laws’ rebuttable
presumptions function as a true bar that effectively incentivizes interrogators
to refrain from using deceptive tactics.
Nonetheless, the Illinois statute essentially utilizes the judicial totality of
the circumstances test to evaluate whether a statement was voluntarily given.
Therefore, the statute runs the risk of failing to provide juvenile suspects with
adequate protections.181 Although Oregon’s statute does not explicitly call
for the totality of the circumstances test in determining whether the
presumption may be overcome, the fact that the statute still establishes only
a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility may not adequately protect
juvenile suspects from the harms of police deceptive tactics.182 Therefore,
state legislation should instead categorically bar the use of police deception
rather than creating a rebuttable presumption that the use of deception renders
a resulting confession involuntary.
Even if a consensus arises that police deception should be categorically
barred, further questions may arise concerning the line between a negligible
misrepresentation and a material misrepresentation that should be
prohibited.183 By the same token, should interrogators be prohibited from
expressing false sympathy toward the suspect to create a rapport with
them?184 In response to these concerns, Professor Phillip E. Johnson drafted
a hypothetical statute which would prohibit police deception intended to
misrepresent certain information without prohibiting interrogators from
expressing sympathy, among other things.185
Professor Johnson’s hypothetical statute is a helpful model for states to
reference while drafting legislation that categorically bars the use of police

178. See Illinois Becomes the First State to Ban Police from Lying to Juveniles During
Interrogations, supra note 96; Oregon Deception Bill is Signed into Law, Banning Police from
Lying to Youth During Interrogations, supra note 98.
179. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.6(c) (2022).
180. 2012 Or. Laws 487.
181. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.6 (2022).
182. 2012 Or. Laws 487.
183. See, e.g., In re Marvin M., 890 N.E.2d 984, 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“The difference
between ‘two’ and ‘several’ is not sufficient to transform the interrogation tactic into
trickery.”).
184. See Magid, supra note 6, at 1174–75.
185. See Phillip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 303, 305 (1986).
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deception in juvenile interrogations.186 State legislation should categorically
bar the police from intentionally misrepresenting evidence or from
intentionally engaging in other deceptive practices that are “fundamentally
unfair.”187 Meanwhile, allowing certain conduct, such as expressing feigned
sympathy, would maintain effective law enforcement and preserve the need
to create a rapport with the suspect, while providing adequate protections for
juvenile suspects.188
CONCLUSION
The courts’ focus on involuntary confessions as due process violations and
their consideration of police deception as only one factor of that evaluation
inadequately protects minors from the severe harms of police deceptive
tactics. Psychological and neurobiological studies repeatedly confirm the
vulnerabilities of youth, including their susceptibility to outside pressures
and willingness to alter their accounts of prior events to please authority.
Such vulnerabilities may cause a minor to falsely confess more frequently
than an adult.
Police deception in juvenile interrogations not only runs the risk of
resulting in false confessions, but also undermines the fundamental fairness
of the criminal justice system. Because adolescents place their trust in and
try to please authority figures, the fact that the police and interrogators may
lie to them to conveniently elicit a confession offends the traditional notions
of due process. Therefore, the courts’ “children are different” jurisprudence
should extend to the sphere of interrogations and invalidate the use of police
deception in juvenile interrogations.

186. Section 3 of Professor Johnson’s hypothetical legislation provides helpful guidance
for states to address the line-drawing problems:
(a) In the custodial interrogation of a suspect, an officer shall not:
(1) Employ force or threats;
(2) Make any statement which is intended to imply or may reasonably be
understood as implying that the suspect will not be prosecuted or punished;
(3) Intentionally misrepresent the amount of evidence available against the
suspect, or the nature or seriousness of the anticipated charges; or
(4) Intentionally misrepresent his identity or employ any other deceptive
stratagem not authorized by this Act which, in the circumstances, is
fundamentally unfair; or
(5) Deny the suspect reasonable opportunity for food and rest.
(b) It does not violate this Act for an officer to:
(1) Express sympathy of compassion for the offender, whether real or feigned;
(2) Suggest that the crime may be morally understandable or excusable, whether
or not the suggestion is sincere;
(3) Appeal to the suspect’s conscience or values, religious or otherwise;
(4) Appeal to the suspect’s sympathy for the victim or other affected persons;
(5) Inform the suspect honestly about the state of the evidence; or
(6) Inform the suspect that a voluntary admission of guilt and sincere repentance
may be given favorable consideration at the time of sentence.
Id.
187. Id.
188. See Magid, supra note 6, at 1168.
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Because the totality of the circumstances test simply considers police
deception to be merely one factor, courts are unable to adequately place limits
on the use of police deception. Instead, state legislatures should pass
legislation that would create a categorical bar on the use of police deception,
regardless of whether the deception results in an involuntary or false
confession. Such legislation should categorically bar law enforcement from
intentionally misrepresenting evidence or from intentionally engaging in
other deceptive practices that are fundamentally unfair.

